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TESTING THE FINANCE-GROWTH LINK: IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?  
 
SUMMARY 
How much does financial development spur economic growth? Does financial intermediation 
affect positively the growth rate of the real GDP? Does the finance-growth link work 
whatever the level of development of countries? A vast empirical literature aims at providing 
an answer to these questions. Using cross-section data, the studies generally conclude in 
favour of a positive correlation between financial intermediation and productivity growth, as 
well as between financial development and capital accumulation (Leeper and Gordon (1992), 
Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1992), King and Levine (1993a, 1993b)). Focusing on the issue of 
causality, other papers find that developed financial markets induce a strong growth and 
conclude in favour of bilateral causality (Jung (1986), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck et al. 
(2000), Calderon and Liu (2003)). The possibility that financial intermediation may be 
beneficial to growth is also evidenced in papers using panel data (Levine et al. (2000) and 
Beck and Levine (2003)).  
The significant link between finance and economic growth is widely accepted, but the 
statistical evidence is based on the assumption of a uniform finance-growth nexus across 
countries. This hypothesis may be criticised, since there are several channels through which 
financial development affects economic growth. Such channels may differ across countries 
and include liquidity effects, financial depth, the role of financial intermediaries, and the 
reduced cost of information. Thus, in uncovering the effect of financial intermediation on the 
real sector, we should consider the possibility that the finance-growth nexus varies across 
nations. Using dynamic specifications allowing for slope heterogeneity across countries, 
Favara (2003) finds results that are in contradiction with the vast literature suggesting that 
finance and growth are positively linked. Not only does financial development have a small 
effect on growth, but also the impact is negative for some combination of variables and 
sample periods. These contradictions can be due to several reasons, such as a questionable use 
of econometric methodologies. What is at stake here is the robustness of the tests and 
estimators applied when one uses panel data.  
In this paper, we revisit the evidence of the existence of a long-run link between financial 
intermediation and economic growth, as regards these methodological problems. We focus on 
the issue of cointegration between the growth rate of real GDP, control variables and three 
series reflecting financial intermediation. To this end, we consider a model with a factor 
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structure that allows us to determine whether the finance-growth link is due to cross countries 
dependence and/or whether it characterises countries with strong heterogeneities. We employ 
techniques recently proposed in the panel data literature, such as PANIC analysis and 
cointegration in common factor models.  
Our results put forward differences between developed and developing countries. More 
specifically, we find that, for the developing countries, cointegration occurs through cross-
member dependence exclusively. For the developed countries, to find a significant 
relationship, we also need to consider the finance-growth links that are specific to each 
country. On the whole, on the 1980-2006 period, our results show that financial 
intermediation — mainly through financial depth which is the most important financial 
variable — is a positive determinant of growth in developed countries, while it acts negatively 
on the economic growth of developing countries.   
 
ABSTRACT 
We revisit the evidence of the existence of a long-run link between financial intermediation 
and economic growth, by testing of cointegration between the growth rate of real GDP, 
control variables and three series reflecting financial intermediation. We consider a model 
with a factor structure that allows us to determine whether the finance-growth link is due to 
cross countries dependence and/or whether it characterises countries with strong 
heterogeneities. We employ techniques recently proposed in the panel data literature, such as 
PANIC analysis and cointegration in common factor models. Our results show differences 
between the developed and developing countries. We run a comparative regression analysis 
on the 1980-2006 period and find that financial intermediation is a positive determinant of 
growth in developed countries, while it acts negatively on the economic growth of developing 
countries.  
 
JEL Classification: C5; G2; O5. 
Keywords: financial intermediation; growth; common factor; panel data; PANIC analysis. 
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LA RELATION FINANCE – CROISSANCE ECONOMIQUE : EXISTE-T-IL UNE DIFFERENCE ENTRE 
LES PAYS DEVELOPPES ET LES PAYS EMERGENTS ?  
 
RESUME LONG 
De quelle manière le développement financier stimule-t-il la croissance économique ? 
L’intermédiation financière affecte-t-elle positivement le taux de croissance du PIB réel ? Le 
lien entre finance et croissance économique s’exerce-t-il quel que soit le niveau de 
développement des pays ? Une littérature importante a tenté de répondre à ces interrogations. 
Les études utilisant des données en coupe tendent généralement à conclure en faveur de 
l’existence d’une corrélation positive entre l’intermédiation financière et la croissance de la 
productivité, tout comme entre le développement financier et l’accumulation du capital 
(Leeper et Gordon (1992), Roubini et Sala-I-Martin (1992), King et Levine (1993a, 1993b)). 
D’autres travaux, centrés sur l’analyse de causalité, montrent que les marchés financiers 
développés induisent une forte croissance économique et concluent en faveur de l’existence 
d’une causalité bilatérale (Jung (1986), Rajan et Zingales (1998), Beck et al. (2000), Calderon 
et Liu (2003)). Le fait que l’intermédiation financière puisse être bénéfique pour la croissance 
est également mis en évidence dans les études utilisant les données de panel (Levine et al. 
(2000), Beck et Levine (2003)).  
La relation significative existant entre finance et croissance économique est globalement 
acceptée dans la littérature, mais l’évidence empirique est basée sur l’hypothèse d’un lien 
uniforme entre finance et croissance entre les différents pays. Cette hypothèse est critiquable 
dans la mesure où il existe de nombreux canaux par lesquels le développement financier peut 
stimuler la croissance et que ceux-ci sont variables selon le niveau de développement des pays 
(effets de liquidité, importance de l’intermédiation financière, rôle des intermédiaires 
financiers et réduction des coûts d’information). En conséquence, il nous semble qu’une étude 
des effets de l’intermédiation financière sur le secteur réel doit tenir compte du fait que la 
liaison entre finance et croissance peut varier selon le pays considéré. Utilisant des 
spécifications dynamiques autorisant une hétérogénéité entre les pays, Favara (2003) obtient 
des résultats en contradiction avec la majorité de la littérature. Non seulement le 
développement financier aurait une faible influence sur la croissance, mais, de plus, son 
impact serait négatif dans certains cas. Cette contradiction peut résulter de divers éléments, 
notamment des techniques économétriques utilisées. Plus précisément, cette contradiction 
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peut être liée au manque de robustesse des tests et des estimateurs appliqués lorsque l’on 
travaille sur données de panel. 
Dans cet article, nous proposons de revisiter l’existence d’une relation de long terme entre 
intermédiation financière et croissance économique, en accordant une attention particulière à 
ces questions de méthodologie économétrique. Nous nous focalisons sur la question de la 
cointégration entre le taux de croissance du PIB réel, un ensemble de variables de contrôle et 
trois séries représentatives de l’intermédiation financière. A cette fin, on considère un modèle 
à facteurs nous permettant de déterminer si le lien entre finance et croissance caractérise des 
pays structurellement différents ou s’il est dû à un artefact (dépendance entre les différents 
pays). Nous utilisons des techniques récentes de l’économétrie des données de panel, comme 
l’analyse PANIC et la cointégration dans les modèles à facteurs communs. Nos résultats font 
ressortir l’existence de différences entre les pays développés et les pays émergents. Plus 
précisément, sur la période 1980-2006, nous montrons que l’intermédiation financière est un 
déterminant positif de la croissance dans les pays développés, alors qu’elle agit négativement 
sur la croissance des pays émergents. 
 
RESUME COURT 
Ce papier a pour objet de revisiter la relation de long terme entre l’intermédiation financière et 
la croissance économique, en testant l’existence de cointégration entre le taux de croissance 
du PIB réel, un ensemble de variables de contrôle et trois séries représentatives de 
l’intermédiation financière. On considère un modèle à facteurs nous permettant de déterminer 
si le lien entre finance et croissance est dû à une dépendance entre les différents pays et/ou s’il 
caractérise des pays présentant de fortes hétérogénéités. Nous utilisons des techniques 
récentes de l’économétrie des données de panel, comme l’analyse PANIC et la cointégration 
dans les modèles à facteurs communs. Nos résultats font ressortir l’existence de différences 
entre les pays développés et les pays émergents. Plus précisément, sur la période 1980-2006, 
nous montrons que l’intermédiation financière est un déterminant positif de la croissance dans 
les pays développés, alors qu’elle agit négativement sur la croissance des pays émergents. 
 
Classification JEL: C5; G2; O5. 
Mots clés : intermédiation financière; croissance; facteurs communs; données de panel; 
analyse PANIC. 
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1. Introduction 
 How much does financial development spur economic growth? Does financial 
intermediation affect positively the growth rate of the real GDP? Does the finance-growth link 
work whatever the level of development of countries? A vast empirical literature aims at 
providing an answer to these questions. Leeper and Gordon (1992), Roubini and Sala-I-
Martin (1992), King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) constitute early attempts to tackle empirically 
these issues. Using cross-section data, the authors conclude in favour of a positive correlation 
between financial intermediation and productivity growth, as well as between financial 
development and capital accumulation. Focusing on the issue of causality, other papers find 
that developed financial markets induce a strong growth and conclude in favour of bilateral 
causality (see, among others, Jung (1986), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck et al. (2000), 
Calderon and Liu (2003)). The possibility that financial intermediation may be beneficial to 
growth is also evidenced in papers using panel data. Two influential papers are Levine et al. 
(2000)’s and Beck and Levine (2003)’s who report general method of moments (GMM) and 
dynamic panel estimates.  
 The significant link between finance and growth or the level of economic development is 
widely accepted, but the statistical evidence is based on the assumption of a uniform finance-
growth nexus across countries. This hypothesis may be criticised, since there are several 
channels through which financial development affects economic growth. These channels have 
been extensively examined in the theoretical literature and include liquidity effects, financial 
depth, the role of financial intermediaries, and the reduced cost of information.1 Thus, in 
uncovering the effect of financial intermediation or development on the real sector, we should 
consider the possibility that the finance-growth nexus varies across nations. If we control for 
slope heterogeneity in a regression that links financial variables to growth, do we find results 
that confirm the well-established significant and positive finance-growth nexus? Favara 
(2003) uses dynamic specifications allowing for slope heterogeneity across countries and find 
results that are in contradiction with the vast literature suggesting that finance and growth are 
positively linked.2 Not only does financial development have a small effect on growth, but 
also the impact is negative for some combination of variables and sample periods. The 
variables and model used by the author are very similar to Levine et al. (2000)’s, but his 
sample is slightly larger and includes more developing countries over a longer time period. 
                                                 
1For a survey of the theoretical arguments, the reader may refer to Levine (2005).  
2 He applies the Pooled Mean Group Estimator (PMGE) proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). 
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 There are several views that can be taken with respect to these contradictory results. One 
position is to look at the historical experiences around the developing countries over the last 
25 years. The observations do not confirm a systematic link between finance and growth. 
There are economies with high growth rates but weak financial and intermediation systems 
(with limited access to long-run financing, limited capacity of domestic banks and paucity of 
financial experience). Ethiopia is a typical example. Other countries have had sluggish growth 
but buoyant stock exchange and credit markets. A typical example is South Africa. In other 
cases, the developments of financial markets and banking activities have been accompanied 
by a resurgence of sustained economic growth. Some Asian and Latin American countries 
may be classified in this third category. Finally, some countries combine low growth rates and 
under-developed banking sector. This concerns many low-income countries. All in all, it may 
prove difficult to conclude in favour or against a significant finance-growth nexus given the 
diversity of the situations, since empirical studies usually measure average effects. 
 A second position is to claim that some variables measuring financial development or 
intermediation have an ambiguous status. The literature has pointed out that variables, such as 
the banking depth, or credit to the private sector, measure the size of the financial sector while 
also being good predictors of banking crises. In this respect, we are not surprised to find a 
non-significant or even negative influence of these variables on growth.  
 A third position leads to say that, in light of the overwhelming empirical evidence of a 
significant link between financial intermediation or development and growth, the results 
obtained by Favara (2003) and other papers that may find a non significant link rely on a 
questionable use of econometric methodologies. What is at stake here is the robustness of the 
tests and estimators applied when one uses panel data.  
 In this paper, we revisit the evidence of the existence of a long-run link between financial 
intermediation and economic growth, as regards the third viewpoint. We focus on the issue of 
cointegration between the growth rate of real GDP, control variables and three series 
reflecting financial intermediation. Using panel data and allowing for the possibility that a 
variety of relationships characterise the finance-growth nexus across countries, we consider 
the basic empirical model: 
  ,3211 ititZitXityity εφφφ +++−=Δ  (1) 
where ity  is the logarithm of the real GDP in country i, itX  and itZ  are two vectors of 
financial intermediation and control variables. itε is an error term. 1φ , 2φ  and 3φ  are vectors 
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of coefficients. We want to see whether growth and its determinants move together over long 
periods and, in this respect, test for the existence of a cointegration relationship. One may 
wonder why growth is our endogenous variable, instead of the level of per-capita GDP, since 
we would expect it to be I(0). A central question is: what is meant by growth? A convergence 
model allows for two types of growth dynamics: on one hand, the convergence to a balance 
growth path (which is expected to be mean-reverting) and, on the other hand, a transitional 
growth dynamics (fluctuations in the neighbourhood of this balanced growth path, which are 
expected to be persistent). It is known that the application of standard unit root tests implies 
size distortions in the presence of transitional growth. These tests are biased towards rejection 
of the null of a unit root and thus may induce inappropriate model specification. The 
application of appropriate tests shows that transitional growth is usually characterised by a 
persistent dynamics (see Bernd and Lütkepohl (2004)). We do not know a priori which types 
of dynamics do characterise our series. So, our growth variables can be either I(0) or I(1).  
 A rejection of the null of no cointegration in Equation (1) is taken as empirical evidence in 
favour of a significant long-run relationship between financial intermediation and growth 
when one controls for the influence of other macroeconomic variables. Doing this, there is a 
caveat that is worth discussing. When one concludes in favour of cointegration, the standard 
tests do not allow saying whether this reflects a long-run relationship between the endogenous 
and explanatory variables in each country, or whether the acceptance of cointegration is 
caused by cross-sectional dependence.3 Cross-member cointegration, if not taken into 
account, induces spurious regression and test analyses (see Barnejee et al. (2004, 2005a, 
2005b), Urbain and Westerlund (2006)). Cointegration among the members of the panel may 
arise for several reasons: the countries belong to the same geographical area, the governments 
implement common economic policies, they face the same macroeconomic constraints, etc. 
This paper examines the finance-growth link in heterogeneous panels, under the assumption 
of cross-sectional dependence. We find that, for the developing countries, cointegration 
occurs through cross-member dependence exclusively. For the developed countries, to find a 
significant relationship, we also need to consider the finance-growth links that are specific to 
each country. This finding is interesting, since it allows us to say something about the 
robustness of studies based on panel data methodologies. As far as the developing countries 
are concerned, pooled-based estimators such as those considered in Levine et al. (2000)’s 
                                                 
3 We call ‘standard’ cointegration tests those proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2004), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), 
which are widely applied to heterogeneous panel data.  
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paper can be considered as being reliable. Assuming homogeneous behaviours across the 
panel is not restrictive. Meanwhile, pooled-based estimators may yield spurious estimations 
when applied to sample of developed countries. In this case, it would be better to use 
estimators allowing for heterogeneous slopes in the regressions.  
 To tackle this issue, our methodology builds on models with an unobserved common 
factor structure proposed in the econometric literature to test for unit root and cointegration in 
panel data (see Bai and Kao (2004), Bai and Ng (2004), Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre 
(2005), Gengenbach et al. (2006), Edgerton and Westerlund (2006), Hanck (2006)). The basic 
idea is that non-stationarity in a variable, or a combination of variables, originates from two 
sources: the presence of cross-sectional common stochastic trends and non-stationary 
idiosyncratic components. The proposed methodology allows extracting the common factors 
and idiosyncratic components in the raw data and applying residual-based tests on the 
defactored data. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly sketches out the 
principles of the econometric approach to test for no-cointegration when a panel is 
characterized by cross-member dependence. In Section 3, we present the data, while Section 4 
contains our comments of the results. Section 5 presents comparative estimations of the long-
run finance-growth relationship. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The econometric methodology 
 The framework considered in this paper builds on Bai and Ng (2004) and Gengenbach et 
al. (2006). We focus on the general philosophy of the methods, referring the reader to the 
authors’ papers for a technical exposition. 
 We consider a regression with a dependent variable itY and an explanatory variable itX : 
  ititit XY εβα ++= . (2) 
The indices i and t refer to cross-section and time-series observations, with i=1,…,N and 
t=1,..,T. Though we assume a bivariate system (with only one explanatory variable) for ease 
of exposition, the arguments can be extended to a multivariate regression. itε  is an error term 
that is iid. Both the dependent and explanatory variables have a factor structure: 
  Xit
X
t
X
i
X
itit
Y
it
Y
t
Y
i
Y
itit eFDXeFDY ++=++= '' , λλ  (3) 
Y
itD  and 
X
itD are deterministic unobserved components (individual specific effects and/or 
individual specific polynomial trend functions). YtF  and 
X
tF are two vectors of common 
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factors and Yiλ , Xiλ are vectors of factor loadings. The common factors describe the behaviour 
of a ‘representative’ member of the panel, while the factor loadings capture the distance of an 
individual from the representative member. Yite  and 
X
ite  are idiosyncratic components 
reflecting the specific behaviour of an individual that is independent of the remainder of the 
panel.  
 Both the common factor and idiosyncratic components are assumed to follow 
autoregressive processes: 
  ,,,1,, 11 TtVFFVFF
X
t
X
t
XX
t
Y
t
Y
t
YY
t L=+Γ=+Γ= −−  (4) 
  ,,,1  ,,1   ,  , 11 TtandNiweewee
X
it
X
it
XX
it
Y
it
Y
it
YY
it KK ==+=+= −− γγ  (5) 
where YΓ , XΓ are matrices of coefficients and Yγ , Xγ are coefficients. YtV , XtV , Yitw , Xitw  are 
respectively matrices and vectors of stationary components. Suppose that some of the 
autoregressive coefficients equal 1. In this case, some of the common factors and/or 
idiosyncratic components have a unit root. The common factors, the idiosyncratic components 
or both may drive the non-stationarity in the data. This implies several cases of cointegration: 
1/ cointegration between the common stochastic trends of Y and X alone (that is cross-member 
cointegration), 2/ cointegration between the I(1) idiosyncratic components, 3/ both types of 
cointegration.  
 Standard panel unit root and cointegration tests, when applied to series with a factor 
structure, suffer from severe distortions and theoretical problems (see Banerjee et al. (2004), 
Urbain (2004), Gengenbach et al. (2005), Urbain and Westerlund (2006)). A major caveat is 
that the distributions of the test statistics are ‘contaminated’ by the presence of unit root in the 
factors. Recent papers on panel unit root and cointegration tests suggest working with de-
factored series, which are original series from which the common factors have been removed. 
The procedure we employ here involves two steps. 
 
 Step 1. We first apply a PANIC analysis (panel data analysis to the idiosyncratic and 
common components) as proposed by Bai and Ng (2004). The approach consists in testing for 
the presence of a unit root in the common factors and idiosyncratic components separately 
instead of considering the observations itX  and itY  directly. Indeed, if one component is I(1) 
and the other I(0), it could be very difficult to establish that a unit root exists from the original 
observations, especially if the stationary component is large. In this case, unit root tests on the 
series itX  and itY  can be expected to be oversized while stationarity tests will have no power. 
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 Step 2. 
2a. If we detect stochastic trends among the common factors and if all the idiosyncratic 
components are I(0), then cointegration between itX  and itY  occurs only if the I(1) common 
factors of itX  cointegrate with the I(1) common factors of itY . In this case, we have cross-
member cointegration. The null of no-cointegration is tested using a Johansen type test.  
2b. Suppose that both I(1) common factors and I(1) idiosyncratic components are detected. 
Then cointegration tests are applied separately on the common and idiosyncratic components. 
We conclude that itX  and itY  are cointegrated if the null of no-cointegration is rejected for 
both the factors and the idiosyncratic components. Tests on the de-factored series (i.e. on the 
idiosyncratic components) are performed using Pedroni (1999, 2004)’s procedures.  
 
3. The data 
 This section presents the data used to test for the existence of a long-run relationship 
between financial intermediation and economic growth. We consider 89 countries annually 
observed from 1980 to 2006: 26 OECD, 21 Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), 17 Middle 
East and Asia (MEA) and 27 Africa. The countries are listed in Appendix 1. The sources and 
definitions of the data are given in Appendix 2. 
 
 Financial intermediation variables  
 We use four measures of financial intermediation. We first consider real credit by 
financial intermediaries to private sector as a ratio of real GDP (CREDIT). This variable is 
used in Levine et al. (2000). We further consider the real domestic credit by the banking 
sector in percentage of the real GDP (CREDBANK). The main difference with the former 
indicator comes from the fact that it does not isolate credit issued to the private sector. We 
also consider a measure of banking intermediation (BANKING) as the ratio of deposit money 
bank domestic assets to the sum of domestic assets from deposit money banks and central 
bank. The use of such an indicator was first suggested by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) 
and captures the ability of commercial banks to find profitable loans more easily than central 
banks. As in King and Levine (1993a), we finally consider a variable of financial depth 
(FIDEPTH), which is the ratio of liquid asset of the financial system to real GDP.4 
                                                 
4 The empirical literature usually distinguishes bank-based and market-based financial system to examine how 
the relative development of stock markets and banking systems affects growth. Banking intermediation is related 
more to the availability of long-term financing, while the financing through securities markets tips to prevail in 
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Control variables 
 The set of control variables includes a proxy for initial conditions, that is the lag real GDP 
per-capita (GDP(-1)), trade openness (OPEN) measured as the sum of exports and imports 
over GDP, a proxy of relative productivity (PROD) that is the ratio of GDP per worker for a 
country to the GDP per worker in the group of G7 and finally the ratio of gross domestic 
investment to GDP (GDI). The choice of these variables is common in the literature that 
explores the finance-growth nexus. Relative productivity summarizes the contribution of the 
quality of the factors of production to the long-run growth, while the rate of investment 
variable is motivated by the fact that a deeper financial intermediation leads to higher factor 
accumulation.  
 
4. Testing for cointegration between financial intermediation and growth 
 
 The OECD countries 
 We begin with the results concerning the OECD countries. This sample is used as a 
benchmark for the developing countries samples. The results of the PANIC procedure are 
shown in Table 1a. Column 2 shows that the number of common factors r varies from 2 to 5. 
These factors are computed using the procedure proposed by Bai and Ng (2002). cePˆ  and 
τ
ePˆ  
are the pooled tests on the idiosyncratic components, respectively in the intercept only model 
and in the linear trend model. cr1 and 
τ
ePˆ are the number of common stochastic trends — that is 
common factors that are I(1) — corresponding to the intercept and linear trend models. We 
denote )( 1
cc
c rMQ , )( 1
cc
f rMQ , )( 1
ττ rMQc and )( 1
ττ rMQc the unit root statistics on the common 
components, in the intercept and linear trend models respectively. The latter are compared to 
theoretical values that are tabulated by Bai and Ng (2004).  
 As shown by the results, all our variables have common stochastic trends, meaning that a 
unit root exists in the common components. The conclusion is more mitigated for the 
idiosyncratic components, depending upon the test used. Some of these components have a 
unit root, especially those related to the financial variables. To test for cointegration among 
the stochastic trends, we consider different combinations of the explanatory variables. The 
estimates reported in the tables concern the models that yield the best results.  
                                                                                                                                                        
the short-run because investors are interested by rapid short-term profits. Since the paper deals with long-run 
relationships, we use variables relating to the development of the banking sector, but we do not consider the 
influence of variables such as foreign direct investment or stock market capitalization. 
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 Table 1b reports the results of the Johansen trace tests on the common stochastic trends. 
When we simply control for the initial level of real GDP, we find one cointegration 
relationship between growth and the financial variables. Not surprisingly, when the number of 
control variables is increased, more long-run relationships are found. Indeed, the effects of 
financial intermediation on economic growth work through multiple channels, notably, an 
increase in factor productivity, an increase in the efficiency of capital accumulation (that is 
transmitted to growth through investment rising). Also, the development of the financial 
sector is important for trade openness to result in a higher growth rate.  
 Table 1c contains the results of the panel cointegration tests on the idiosyncratic 
components, when this makes sense. Indeed, we test for cointegration between the variables 
that are I(1).  As is seen from Table 1a, the idiosyncratic components of many explanatory 
variables are I(0), so that we can only test the existence of a cointegration relationship 
between growth and the following financial variables: (i) BANKING, FIDEPTH (Model 1) 
and (ii) CREDIT, FIDEPTH (Model 2). We compute the seven statistics of the Pedroni 
(1999)’s test and find that the null of no-cointegration is often rejected. 
 On the whole, for the OECD countries, our results show the existence of cointegrating 
relationships between financial integration and economic growth. This conclusion is valid for 
the common components, but also when considering the idiosyncratic components.  
 
Insert Tables (1a)-(1c) about here 
 
 What is different with the developing countries? 
 Tables (2a)-(2b), (3a)-(3b) and (4a)-(4b) present similar results respectively for the 
Middle East and Asian, African and Latin American and Caribbean countries. The main 
difference with the OECD countries is that we cannot find a long-run relationship between the 
financial intermediation and growth when considering the idiosyncratic components. This 
occurs because, either the idiosyncratic component of the endogenous variable is I(0) (the 
case of MEA and African countries), or the idiosyncratic components of the financial 
variables are themselves I(0) (the case of LAC countries). One can consider that common 
factors refer to the intra-individual dynamics, since they reflect the behaviour of something 
common to the countries over time. Idiosyncratic components capture the inter-individual 
differences. According to the above results, the developing countries are not heterogeneous 
enough – in terms of the financial intermediation channels that are conducive to growth – so 
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that the time series properties of the finance-growth link may be very different from those of 
disaggregated data if the countries were considered individually. Considering the countries’ 
specificities does not provide any information on the existence of a long-run relationship. 
Conversely, in the developed countries, there are several elements that distinguish the 
countries from each other. Some of these elements are of a microeconomic nature. For 
instance, the success of the link between financial intermediation and growth depends upon 
the capacities of individual firms to mobilize the available funds and transform them into 
profitable and innovative projects that promote growth (see, for instance, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)). Other differences among the countries come from differences in technology, profit 
rates, investment and demand opportunities. These create differences in the amount of 
financial need needed by the firms (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)). In the 
developing countries, such differences are not acute since, for some of them, they rely on 
loans by foreign donors (the domestic banking markets are characterised by severe market 
frictions).  
 
Insert Tables (2a)-(2b), (3a)-(3b) and (4a)-(4b) about here 
 
5. Comparing the estimates of the developed and developing countries 
 We now estimate the long-run relationships. We split the countries into two groups on the 
basis of our findings. We cannot apply the same estimators to the groups of developed and 
developing countries. Indeed, for the OECD countries we find cointegration relationships 
between both the common factors and idiosyncratic components, while cointegration is only 
found in the common factors for the group of MEA, LAC and African countries. In light of 
our discussion in the last paragraph, for the OECD countries, we thus need an estimator 
involving aspects of both homogeneous behaviours (due to common factors) and 
heterogeneous behaviours (due to idiosyncratic components). In this respect, for OECD 
countries, we apply the pooled mean group (PMG) method proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999). 
It restricts the long-run coefficients to be equal across countries, but allows for short-run 
coefficients and variances to differ across groups. This amounts to assuming that, though the 
level of financial intermediation has similar effects in the long run, there are heterogeneous 
adjustments across countries to changes in the level of financial intermediation. For the MEA, 
African and LAC countries, as a consequence of our previous discussion, pooling the data 
yields enough information about the link between growth and financial intermediation. We 
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thus apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) usually employed in dynamic panel 
models. 
 
 Let us first comment the results relating to OECD countries. Estimates of the long-run 
coefficients based on the PMG estimator are displayed in Table 5. Note that, although we 
consider short-run coefficients in the regressions, our main interest is on the long-run 
relationships. The short-run coefficients are considered here since they influence the estimates 
of the long-run coefficients. We control for the cross-sectional dependence by demeaning the 
data, taking each variable in deviation from its cross sectional mean. The estimates suggest 
that in three models out of four, the relationship between financial intermediation and growth 
is positive, though the elasticities seem small in magnitude. Private credit is significant only at 
the 10% level of confidence in model 2, but insignificant in model 4. The impact of financial 
depth is increased when other macroeconomic variables are appropriately controlled for. We, 
however, find a negative impact of banking intermediation in model 1. Favara (2003) also 
finds that, when using panel estimators with heterogeneous slope coefficients, the relationship 
between finance and growth can sometimes be puzzlingly negative. One explanation of the 
negative sign of the variable BANKING may be that, the size of the banking system 
inadequately captures the beneficial effect of financial intermediary development on growth. 
The financial depth seems more appropriate to measure the channels through which finance 
positively affects growth in the developed countries, namely the amelioration of information 
frictions and the reduction of transaction costs. Another explanation of the negative sign may 
be that the OECD sample is composed of a majority of countries with a market-based 
financial development. So, BANKING is not the appropriate variable. 
 Comparing the usual estimates found in the literature to ours, we observe that the latter are 
much smaller in magnitude. For instance, using a GMM estimator, Levine et al. (2000) obtain 
an elasticity of 1.52 for private credit, 2.95 for liquid liabilities and 2.43 for banking 
intermediation. We checked that our findings are not due to misspecifications. The models 
pass the h-test. Indeed a p-value greater than 0.05 indicates no significant differences between 
the PMG and mean group estimator, thereby suggesting that our assumption of long-run 
homogenous coefficient is valid. Also, the lags in our models were appropriately selected in 
an ADRL model using Akaike criterion. The higher magnitude of the elasticities of the 
financial variables obtained in the literature may come from the fact that, assuming 
homogeneous impact of finance on growth across countries in a dynamic model where units 
are heterogeneous, yields upward biased estimated. This is not to say that those results are 
  16
false, but the estimates are not robust to the estimators used and the presence of idiosyncratic 
components can lead to misleading conclusions.  
 The non-financial variables, when significant, have the expected signs. We find a positive 
impact of the degree of openness on growth, a positive impact of productivity and of the 
investment rate. The lagged real GDP shows a convergence phenomenon between the OECD 
countries. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
 We now turn to the non-OECD countries. Tables 6 and 7 contain the results for the 
developing countries. We apply a GMM system estimation by combining the regressions in 
differences with the regressions in levels, as suggested in Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The instruments for the regressions in levels are the lagged 
differences of the endogenous and explanatory variables, while the instruments in the 
regressions in differences are the lagged values of the variables in levels. The validity of the 
instruments is tested using the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. We use a 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. As is seen in the Tables 
all the regressions pass the Sargan test, meaning that our instruments are valid. A striking 
difference of these regressions compared to those of the developed countries is the negative 
impact of the financial intermediation variables on growth in many regressions, whether or 
not the elasticities are statistically significant. The negative influence of the financial variables 
on the real economy in the developing countries is frequent in the empirical literature. This 
finding has received different interpretations. For instance, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) 
find a long-run negative correlation between financial development and growth in a panel data 
for Latin America and interpret their result as the effects of liberalisation experience of the 
financial markets in these countries. Indeed, as noticed by the authors, during the 1970s and 
1980s, Latin American financial markets were exposed to extreme conditions. In this context, 
according to De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), their results “may reflect the effects of 
experiments of extreme liberalisation of financial markets followed by their subsequent 
collapse”. Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1998) find a similar negative correlation on a panel of 
82 countries over the period from 1960 to 1990. They proposed an interpretation in terms of 
threshold effects in the finance-growth relationship, the threshold being associated with the 
existence of multiple equilibria. More specifically, two stable equilibria exist: a low 
equilibrium such that slow growth is coupled with a weak-banking sector, and a high 
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equilibrium such that strong growth is associated with developed financial intermediation. 
Between these two equilibria, an unstable equilibrium exists which determines the threshold 
effect of financial intermediation on economic growth. Finally, our results highlight 
differences among the developing countries. The financial variables are very often significant 
for the LAC and MEA countries (in three regressions out of four), but quite never significant 
for the African countries (only one regression). The financial depth seems to be the most 
determinant financial variable that explains the link between financial intermediation and 
growth. 
 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here 
 
6. Conclusion  
 In this paper, we have re-examined the question of the impact of financial intermediation 
on economic growth by considering the implications of cross sectional dependence in panel 
data. We found that this impact is explained by cross-country cointegration in the developing 
countries, while specific country effects also matter for the developed ones. This finding has 
some implications in terms of estimation. For the former, pooled-based panel data methods 
are indicated, while for the latter estimators allowing for possible heterogeneities among the 
countries are more appropriate. A comparative analysis of the regressions shows a major 
difference between both categories of countries. While financial intermediation variables 
positively influence growth in the OECD countries, they enter negatively in the finance-
growth relationship for the developing countries. This calls for caution when considering 
panel data studies where all the countries are included in a same sample. 
 The present analysis can be extended in several ways. It would be interesting to 
consider the implications of the common-idiosyncratic decomposition in terms of regression 
analysis and not only in terms of cointegration testing procedures as we did here. Also, 
examining the issue of causality in the framework of common factor models would seem a 
promising approach.  
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Appendix 1. List of countries  
 
OECD Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Middle East and Asia Africa 
Australia Argentina Bangladesh Burundi 
Austria Bolivia India Cameroon 
Belgium Brazil Indonesia Central Africa 
Canada Chile Iran Islamic Republic Chad 
Denmark Colombia Israel Congo Republic 
Finland Costa Rica Jordan Benin 
France  Dominican Republic Korea Ethiopia 
Germany Ecuador Malaysia Gabon 
Greece El Salvador Nepal Ghana 
Iceland Guatemala Pakistan Côte d’Ivoire 
Ireland Haiti Papua New Guinea  Kenya 
Italy Honduras Philippine Lesotho 
Japan Jamaica Singapore Madagascar 
Korea Mexico Sri Lanka Malawi 
Luxembourg Nicaragua Syria Mali 
Mexico Panama Thailand Mauritius 
New Zealand  Paraguay  Morocco 
Norway Peru  Niger 
Portugal Trinidad and Tobago  Nigeria 
Spain Uruguay  South Africa 
Sweden Venezuela  Zimbabwe 
Switzerland   Rwanda 
The Netherlands   Senegal 
Turkey   Sierra Leone 
United Kingdom   Togo 
USA   Uganda 
   Zambia 
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Appendix 2. Definition of variables and sources 
 
Variable Description and sources  
Financial variables  
 
Financial depth Ratio of liquid asset of the financial system to GDP. As in King 
and Levine (1993), we choose M3 or M2 if M3 is not available. 
The ratio is computed as follows  
                            
( )
a
tt
e
tt
e
tt
CPIGDP
CPIMCPIM
/
/3/35.0 11 −−+×  
where eCPI and aCPI are end-of-period and average CPI and 
GDP is nominal GDP in local currency.  
Sources :  
- Nominal GDP: World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
- M2: WDI for the developing countries. For UK and the 
European countries, we use M3 from Eurostat statistics 
until 1998 (M3 from 1998 to 2006 is based upon authors’ 
calculation). 
- CPI end of period: WDI and IFS. 
- Average CPI: computed from the series of end of period 
CPI.  
Banking intermediation Ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money 
bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets.  
Source: IFS. Numerator =line 22 and denominator = sum of lines 
22 and 12.  
 
Credit to private sector (as a 
ratio of GDP) 
Domestic credit to private sector in percentage of GDP. 
Source: WDI.  
Domestic credit by banking 
sector in % of GDP  
The ratio is computed as follows  
                            
( )
a
tt
e
tt
e
tt
CPIGDP
CPICREDCPICRED
/
//5.0 11 −−+×  
where CRED is credit by banking sector, eCPI and aCPI are end-
of-period and average CPI and GDP is nominal GDP in local 
currency.  
Sources :  
- CRED = line 22D (IFS). 
- CPI end of period: WDI and IFS. 
- Average CPI: computed from the series of end of period 
CPI. 
- Nominal GDP: World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
 
 
Control variables 
 
 
Degree of openness  Sum of real exports and real imports as share of real per-capita 
GDP. 
Sources: WDI and OECD. 
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Gross domestic investment 
(as share of GDP) 
Source: IFS and WDI. 
 
 
Relative productivity Ratio of GDP per worker for a country to the GDP per worker in 
Group of Seven (G-7).  
Source: we collect data on labour force and GDP for each country 
from the Global Development Finance. We compute the ratio of 
GDP to labour force to obtain the GDP per worker. 
 
Real per-capita GDP To obtain the per-capita GDP, we use a population series from the 
World Bank Development Indicators. To compute the real value, 
we use the GDP deflator and the CPI if the GDP deflator is not 
available.  
Source: WDI. 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Growth First-difference of log of the real GDP. 
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Table 1a. Results of the PANIC procedure  
Sample 1: OECD Countries 
 Constant term case Linear trend case 
 r  τ
ePˆ  
(ADF) 
c
ePˆ  
(GLS) 
cr1  )( 1
cc
c rMQ  )( 1
cc
f rMQ r 
τ
ePˆ  
(ADF) 
c
ePˆ  
(GLS) 
τ
ePˆ  )( 1
ττ rMQc )( 1
ττ rMQf  
GROWTH 2 92.1082 103.734 2 -29.4166** -27.4623 2 73.3989 48.0876 2 -29.5236** -27.3803 
GDP(-1)             
PROD 5 27.8561*** 35.3441*** 5 -25.1246 -30.1884 5 40.2661*** 35.0854*** 5 -25.7844 -30.7219 
INFLATION             
GDI 5 21.2283*** 29.4646*** 5 -11.3106 -18.5901 5 16.9399*** 17.3612*** 5 -22.0715 -26.5748 
OPEN 4 54.1434 58.2573 4 -11.4119 -11.6739 4 42.9606*** 39.9876*** 4 -12.1601 -15.4057 
CREDBANK 4 38.7249*** 30.3147*** 3 -11.2858 -12.3643 4 43.5571*** 32.7957*** 3 -14.6480 -17.5660 
CREDPRIV 5 54.4530 30.6248*** 4 -11.6657 -18.5470 5 51.1784 38.2720*** 5 -42.8063 -28.5570 
BANKING 4 63.2747 34.1565*** 4 -17.3053 -16.3907 4 43.8577*** 26.0227*** 4 -19.9899 -25.8042 
FIDEPTH 5 78.8480 38.5228*** 5 -15.7827 -24.2071 5 75.3094 28.7374*** 5 -24.8323 -21.2789 
Note: r is the number of common factors obtained by applying the Bai and Ng (2002)’ procedure. cePˆ  and 
τ
ePˆ are the pooled tests on the 
idiosyncratic components, respectively in the intercept only model and in the linear trend model. cr1 and 
τ
ePˆ are the number of common stochastic 
trends corresponding to the intercept and linear trend models. We denote )( 1
cc
c rMQ , )( 1
cc
f rMQ , )( 1
ττ rMQc and )( 1
ττ rMQc the unit root statistics on 
the common components, in the intercept and linear trend models respectively. *: (resp. **, ****) indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis 
(unit root) at the 10% (resp. 5%, 1%) significance level. 
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Table 1b. Johansen trace tests on the common stochastic trends  
Sample 1: OECD countries 
Model 1: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), BANKING, FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 69.39 63.0 39.62 31.40 - 
R=1 29.77 42.4 20.2 25.5 1 
R=2 9.57 25.3 9.01 19.0 - 
R=3 0.56 12.2 0.56 12.20 - 
Model 2: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), CREDIT, FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 65.99 63.0 27.17 31.4 - 
R=1 32.44 42.4 21.12 25.5 1 
R=2 10.76 25.3 16.15 19.0 - 
R=3 0.48 12.2 0.68 12.20 - 
Model 3: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), PROD, GDI, OPEN ,FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 759.48 114.9 623.83 44.0 - 
R=1 135.65 87.3 79.50 37.5 - 
R=2 56.14 63.0 28.57 31.4 2 
R=3 27.57 42.4 15.65 25.5 - 
R=4 11.91 25.3 11.9 19.0 - 
R=5 0.0039 12.20 0.004 12.2 - 
Model 4: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), PROD, GDI, OPEN,  CREDIT) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 773.62 114.9 626.23 44.0 - 
R=1 147.38 87.3 64.99 37.5 - 
R=2 82.39 63.0 40.76 31.4 - 
R=3 41.63 42.4 28.83 25.5 3.4 
R=4 12.79 25.3 11.22 19.0 - 
R=5 1.57 12.20 1.57 12.2 - 
Note: the number of cointegration relationships corresponds to the line where the statistics is below the critical value. 
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Table 1c. Panel cointegration tests on the idiosyncratic components   
Sample 1: OECD countries 
Vector of variables : (GROWTH, GDP(-1), BANKING, FIDEPTH) 
 GROUP ρ  Panel ρ  GROUP PP PANEL PP GROUP 
ADF 
PANEL ADF PANEL υ  
Model with constant -1.76 -2.31 -9.26 -6.85 -9.10 -∞  -4.34 
Model with linear trend 0.64 -0.25 -6.52 -5.82 -6.47 -∞  -6.96 
Vector of variables : (GROWTH, GDP(-1), CREDIT, FIDEPTH) 
 GROUP ρ  Panel ρ  GROUP PP PANEL PP GROUP 
ADF 
PANEL ADF PANEL υ  
Model with constant -0.70 -1.66 -10.01 -7.06 -8.50 -∞  -4.34 
Model with linear trend 1.39 0.52 -8.64 -6.32 -6.93 -∞  -7.04 
 
Note: The statistics are distributed as standard normal asymptotically. The panel v rejects the null of no cointegration for large positive values 
(here for values higher than 1.64 at the 5% level) whereas the other six tests reject it with large negative values (here for values less than –1.64 at 
the 5% level). 
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Table 2a. Results of the PANIC procedure  
Sample 2: Middle East and Asian Countries 
 Constant term case Linear trend case 
 r  c
ePˆ  
(ADF) 
c
ePˆ  
(GLS) 
cr1  )( 1
cc
c rMQ  )( 1
cc
f rMQ r 
τ
ePˆ  
(ADF) 
c
ePˆ  
(GLS) 
τ
ePˆ  )( 1
ττ rMQc )( 1
ττ rMQf  
GROWTH 2 26.1682*** 32.6263*** 2 -22.7488 -21.6640 2 30.5022*** 15.4474*** 2 -20.4081 -23.5071 
GDP(-1)             
PROD 5 21.6060*** 28.5222*** 5 -16.7164 -21.6163 5 50.7782 36.1162 5 -19.3162 -19.4807 
INFLATION             
GDI 4 25.4094*** 33.7483 4 -14.6568 -18.8896 4 21.7431*** 21.1723*** 4 -15.4207 -26.4187 
OPEN 4 28.8751*** 27.3567*** 4 -14.6568 -18.8896 4 31.3363*** 26.6309*** 4 -16.7592 -22.2764 
CREDBANK 5 50.4684 42.6428 5 -17.4166 -29.2152 5 48.9477 21.6723*** 5 -20.9768 -30.4165 
CREDPRIV 5 31.6639*** 39.3542 5 -12.2802 -29.6594 5 21.9123*** 28.6667*** 5 -14.6671 -23.1799 
BANKING 5 20.5363*** 23.5901*** 5 -15.0078 -30.1069 5 37.9036 26.8865*** 5 -16.7032 -28.8762 
FIDEPTH 5 24.4179*** 24.4173*** 5 -24.5159 -26.1820 5 17.9523*** 15.4482*** 5 -27.6807 -25.3984 
Note: see footnote Table 1a. 
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Table 2b. Johansen trace tests on the common stochastic trends  
Sample 2: Middle East and Asian Countries 
Model 1: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), BANKING, FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 70.60 63.0 43.06 31.4 - 
R=1 27.53 42.4 20.72 25.5 1 
R=2 6.81 25.3 6.81 19.0 - 
R=3 0.0026 12.2 0.0026 12.20 - 
Model 2: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), CREDIT, FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 74.59 63.0 40.71 31.4 - 
R=1 33.88 42.4 22.51 25.5 1 
R=2 11.37 25.3 10.82 19.0 - 
R=3 0.5426 12.2 0.54 12.0 - 
Model 3: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), PROD, GDI, OPEN ,FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 730.4 114.9 589.46 44.0 - 
R=1 140.94 87.3 56.53 37.5 - 
R=2 84.41 63.0 44.85 31.4 - 
R=3 39.56 42.4 33.95 25.5 3 
R=4 5.61 25.3 5.51 19.0 - 
R=5 0.0962 12.2 0.09  - 
Model 4: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), PROD, GDI, OPEN,  CREDIT) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 763.99 114.9 636.31 44.0 - 
R=1 127.68 87.3 57.21 37.5 - 
R=2 70.46 63.0 36.10 31.4 - 
R=3 34.36 42.4 22.54 25.5 3 
R=4 11.82 25.3 10.74 19.0 - 
R=5 1.08 12.2 1.08 12.2 - 
Note: see footnote Table 1b. 
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Table 3a. Results of the PANIC procedure  
Sample 3: African Countries 
 Constant term case Linear trend case 
 r  c
ePˆ  
(ADF) 
c
ePˆ  
(GLS) 
cr1  )( 1
cc
c rMQ  )( 1
cc
f rMQ r 
τ
ePˆ  
(ADF) 
c
ePˆ  
(GLS) 
τ
ePˆ  )( 1
ττ rMQc )( 1
ττ rMQf  
GROWTH 2 39.1686*** 43.2443*** 2 -28.6520** -26.9608 2 32.4968*** 18.5603*** 2 -28.7930** -26.7172 
GDP(-1)             
PROD 3 47.8277 29.8105*** 3 -16.1726 -18.0178 3 50.7979 31.8441*** 3 -15.6077 -20.0946 
INFLATION             
GDI 4 54.1556 36.8980*** 4 -22.5594 -28.2034 4 77.0983 39.5971*** 4 -21.2667 -26.3341 
OPEN 5 32.1327*** 35.1092*** 5 -31.5118 -33.6793 5 53.4519 27.4564*** 5 -29.6243 -29.2977 
CREDBANK 4 45.5653*** 48.8107 4 -19.4650 -24.1626 4 58.7232 43.6052*** 4 -20.1974 -26.4609 
CREDPRIV 4 39.6246*** 41.7346*** 4 -15.6775 -18.2977 4 58.4983 32.8310*** 4 -21.0408 -26.6082 
BANKING 5 38.6219*** 35.8560*** 5 -22.1600 -27.3955 5 60.6811 29.0595*** 5 -24.3052 -32.2486 
FIDEPTH 4 39.1283*** 37.9579*** 4 -14.8262 -19.4187 4 31.4391*** 26.9544*** 4 -17.8738 -21.6866 
Note: see footnote Table 1a. 
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Table 3b. Johansen trace tests on the common stochastic trends  
Sample 3: African countries 
Model 1: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), BANKING, FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 93.68 63.0 51.69 31.4 - 
R=1 41.98 42.4 30.36 25.50 - 
R=2 11.61 25.3 7.93 19.00 2 
R=3 3.67 12.2 3.67 12.20 - 
Model 2: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), CREDIT, FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 79.82 63.0 34.78 31.4 - 
R=1 44.84 42.4 26.96 25.5 - 
R=2 17.88 25.3 15.69 19.0 2 
R=3 2.19 12.2 2.19 12.2 - 
Model 3: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), PROD, GDI, OPEN ,FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 735.22 114.9 590.14 44.00 - 
R=1 145.08 87.3 81.86 37.50 - 
R=2 63.22 63.0 30.42 31.4 2.3 
R=3 32.79 42.4 18.06 25.5 - 
R=4 14.73 25.3 8.78 19.0 - 
R=5 5.95  5.96 12.2 - 
Model 4: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), PROD, GDI, OPEN, CREDIT) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 766.67 114.90 629.01 44.0 - 
R=1 137.66 87.3 70.33 37.5 - 
R=2 67.33 63.0 36.96 31.4 - 
R=3 30.37 42.4 20.21 25.5 3 
R=4 10.16 25.3 5.93 19.00 - 
R=5 4.21 12.2 4.22 12.2 - 
Note: see footnote Table 1b. 
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Table 4a. Results of the PANIC procedure  
Sample 4: Latin America and Caribbean Countries 
 Constant term case Linear trend case 
 r  c
ePˆ  
(ADF) 
c
ePˆ  
(GLS) 
cr1  )( 1
cc
c rMQ  )( 1
cc
f rMQ r 
τ
ePˆ  
(ADF) 
c
ePˆ  
(GLS) 
τ
ePˆ  )( 1
ττ rMQc )( 1
ττ rMQf  
GROWTH 2 65.0408 63.9437 1 -13.5507 -13.4272 2 48.3224 37.2968*** 1 -13.4629 -13.1753 
GDP(-1)             
PROD 4 68.9953 38.4197*** 4 -21.7107 -17.9022 4 42.0323 22.7412*** 4 -23.3279 -22.4379 
INFLATION             
GDI 4 46.4094 33.8212*** 4 -15.3341 -21.2848 4 27.8057*** 14.4343*** 4 -16.8097 -22.4046 
OPEN 4 27.0375*** 30.6668*** 4 -21.5791 -20.8114 4 29.1287*** 25.1421*** 4 -23.2765 -21.2074 
CREDPRIV 4 36.8767*** 38.6353*** 4 -18.9808 -23.5416 4 26.7843*** 27.6471*** 4 -21.8831 -23.0876 
BANKING 3 30.7293*** 24.0773*** 3 -11.6513 -15.5337 3 21.5791*** 21.7176*** 3 -11.8570 -15.1046 
FIDEPTH 5 47.4547 38.0629*** 5 -31.2227 -21.6383 5 38.2491*** 34.7736*** 5 -32.5413 -25.0245 
Note: see footnote Table 1a. 
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Table 4b. Johansen trace tests on the common stochastic trends 
Sample 4: Latin American and Caribbean countries 
Model 1: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), BANKING, FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 76.31 63.0 40.11 31.4 - 
R=1 36.20 42.4 28.19 25.5 1,2 
R=2 8.01 25.3 6.98 19.0 - 
R=3 1.03 12.2 1.03 12.2 - 
Model 2: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), CREDIT, FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 69.89 63.0 41.68 31.4 - 
R=1 28.21 42.4 17.67 25.5 1 
R=2 10.54 25.3 8.82 19.0 - 
R=3 1.72 12.20 1.72 12.2 - 
Model 3: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), PROD, GDI, OPEN ,FIDEPTH) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 ∞+ 114.9 ∞+  44.00 - 
R=1 122.43 87.3 74.81 37.5 - 
R=2 47.62 63.0 27.75 31.40 2 
R=3 19.86 42.4 15.33 25.5 - 
R=4 4.53 25.3 4.51 19.00 - 
R=5 0.02 12.2 0.0221  - 
Model 4: vector=(GROWTH, GDP(-1), PROD, GDI, OPEN, CREDIT) 
 Trace test Critical value 
(5%) max
λ  Critical value 
(5%) 
Cointegration 
rank 
R=0 727.13 114.9 592.35 44.0 - 
R=1 134.78 87.3 83.08 37.5 - 
R=2 51.70 63.0 25.9 31.4 2 
R=3 25.79 42.4 193.4 25.5 - 
R=4 6.45 25.3 6.13 19.00 - 
R=5 0.323 12.2 0.32 12.20 - 
Note: see footnote Table 1b. 
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Table 5. PMG estimator – Long-run coefficients 
Sample 1: OECD countries 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef t-ratio h-test p-val Coef t-ratio h-test p-val Coef t-ratio h-test p-val Coef t-ratio h-test p-val 
GDP-1 -0.016* -5.27 2.39 0.12 -0.02* -8.56 0.01 0.92 -0.072* -18.36 3.69 0.05 -0.069* -5.56 1.67 0.20 
PROD - - - - - - - - 0.072* 28.49 4.36 0.04 0.024* 2.89 0.87 0.35 
GDI - - - - - - - - 0.072* 20.73 0.25 0.61 0.011 1.34 0.96 0.33 
OPEN - - - - - - - - 0.048* 21.51 0.08 0.77 0.005** 1.705 0.99 0.32 
BANKING -0.057* -3.78 0.19 0.66 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FIDEPTH 0.08* 3.27 0.16 0.69 0.011* 4.99 0.17 0.68 0.037* 20.01 0.39 0.53 - - - - 
CREDIT  - - - 0.002** 1.957 1.61 0.20 - - - - 0.002 0.89 1.00 0.32 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. ** Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Estimation is on demeaned data. The h-test is 
constructed as equivalence between the pooled mean group and the mean group estimates (see Pesaran et al. (1999)). Probability values are provided for this test. A value less 
than 0.05 leads to reject homogeneity of cross-section’s long-run coefficients.  
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Table 6. GMM system estimator – Coefficients of the model expressed in first-differences 
 
Samples 2 and 3: Middle East and Asian countries, African countries 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 MEA AFRICA MEA AFRICA MEA AFRICA MEA AFRICA 
 Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio 
Constant 0.006* 1.82 0.004 0.42 0.009** 1.92 0.0013 0.76 0.013* 6.05 0.0032 0.06 0.013$* 6.17 7.05E-5 0.016 
GROWTH-1 0.29* 2.91 0.08 0.60 0.258* 2.51 0.02 0.20 0.135** 1.68 -0.006 -0.08 0.104 1.33 -0.0001 -0.001 
PROD - - - - - - - - 0.186 3.74 0.125* 3.35 0.206* 3.80 0.16* 3.73 
GDI - - - - - - - - 0.023 0.517 0.016 0.541 0.026 0.562 0.018 0.64 
OPEN - - - - - - - - 0.039 1.16 0.109* 2.91 0.036 1.16 0.104* 2.68 
BANKING 0.024 0.46 0.04 1.49 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FIDEPTH -0.142* -2.52 -0.10* -2.53 -0.147* -2.49 -0.04 -1.53 -0.08* -2.12 -0.07** -1.68 - - - - 
CREDIT - - - - -0.0001 -0.107 -0.04 -1.30 - - - - -0.009 -0.649 -0.03 -1.49 
DUM_9798 0.019 0.66 - - -0.003 -0.08 - - -0.02** -1.87 -  -0.024* -1.96   
DUM_9100   -0.005 -0.279 - - - - - - 0.005 0.824     
 Sargan p-value Sargan p-value Sargan p-value Sargan p-value Sargan p-value Sargan p-value Sargan p-value Sargan p-value 
 0.0004 0.99 0.0007 0.99 0.0003 0.99 0.016 0.99 0.0003 0.99 0.0026 0.99 0.0004 0.99 0.002 0.99 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. ** Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. For the Sargan test, the null is that the instruments 
are not correlated with the estimated residuals. 
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Table 7. GMM system estimator – Coefficients of the model expressed in first-differences 
 
Sample 4: Latin American and Caribbean countries 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
 Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio Coef t-ratio coef t-ratio 
Constant 0.002* 2.42 0.003* 3.09 0.003* 2.72 0.003* 2.95 
GROWTH-1 0.228* 2.20 0.233* 2.85 0.172 1.62 0.193* 2.59 
PROD - - - - 0.09* 4.13 0.101* 4.49 
GDI - - - - 0.068* 2.87 0.074* 2.97 
OPEN - - - - 0.077* 3.13 0.066* 2.78 
BANKING 0.07* 3.48 - - - - - - 
FIDEPTH -0.032* -3.13 -0.019* -0.537 -0.2* -2.40 - - 
CREDIT - - -0.022* -2.50 - - -0.031 -1.06 
 Sargan  p-value Sargan p-value Sargan p-value Sargan p-value 
 0.0008 0.99 0.0006 0.99 0.0006 0.99 0.0006 0.99 
Note: See footnote Table 6. 
 
